Using ENDL to verify cardholder registration in SET protocol by Chen, QF & Zhang, CQ
616 Proceedings of International Conference on e-Business May 23-26 2002 Beijing
Using ENDL to Verify Cardholder
Registration in SET Protocol
Qingfeng Chen, Chengqi Zhang
Faculty of Information Technology
University of Technology, Sydney
P.O. Box 123, Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia
qchen@it.uts.edu.au, chengqi@it.uts.edu.au
Abstract: Secure electronic commerce relies on the
application of secure transaction protocol. However,
even with the so-called secure protocol, the
communication can be compromised frequently
without effective approach to detect the subtle flaws
before it launches into practice. We generated
ENDL[2] that is used to formally verify the
authentication properties of secure transaction
protocols. We have showed how to employ it to depict
the complicated security properties of secure
protocols, especially the instances in SET (Secure
Electronic Transaction) protocol, in our previous work
[3]. The first stage of the SET protocol, namely
Cardholder Registration, has been defined in book [1]
respectively. It formally describes the seven
fundamental steps of the flow of transactions in
outline. Based on the ENDL, we describe the whole
verification of cardholder registration process in this
paper. Some potentially dangerous flaws of SET
protocol are noted while verifying the protocol.
Keywords: Security; Verification; Integrity;
Confidentiality; Electronic Commerce
1. Introduction
The electronic commerce is playing a more and more
important role in the global economic growth today.
Its development is at a critical juncture since the
participants want to achieve secure access to
electronic transactions and other services. Many
electronic commerce protocols [1][4] etc. mainly use
encryption and decryption functions to achieve the
secure requirements, which typically involved two or
three participants and can be described easily. But the
cryptographic protocol is prone to error, and a number
of well-known and largely used cryptographic
protocols have been proved to have flaws [13] etc. For
this reason, using formal methods to verify such
protocols has received increasing attentions.
Formal methods have been mainly applied to
authentication protocols, and have shown successful
in finding problems or flaws in protocols [5][6].
During the past decade, researchers have developed
different types of logic that formalize inference about
what the protocol participant can be confident of
regarding the authentication properties of protocols.
The main purpose is to construct the proof to verify
whether a protocol satisfies the basic aspects of
confidentiality and integrity. BAN logic, developed by
Burrows, Abadi, and Needham [6], utilizes modal
logics similar to those that have been developed for
the analysis of the evolution of knowledge and belief
in distributed systems and transforms the protocol into
a sequence of abstract logical notations. Gong,
Needham, and Yahalom developed another logic,
GNY logic, which is based on BAN logic but
expressed in a more low level of abstraction [7]. It
makes explicitly any assumption required, but is much
more complicated and elaborate than other methods as
it has so many rules need to be considered in each
stage. BGNY logic, developed by Brackin [8],
implements the Gong's refinement to the original
GNY logic and is an extended version of GNY logic,
which is used by software that automatically proves
authentication properties of cryptographic protocols.
Kailar developed special-purpose logic to be used for
analysis of simple electronic commerce protocols that
conform to accountability [9]. There are still lots of
related formal methods, such as AUTLOG [10] etc.,
while an entire introduction is beyond the scope of
this paper.
These approaches used to verify the cryptographic
protocols have been developed to meet the demand of
the verification of authentication protocols. Although
the method developed by Kailar has been prove to be
successful in analysis electronic commerce protocols,
it has limitation and only succeeds in verifying simple
protocols. There have been attempts to verify more
realistic protocols such as TLS/SSL [11]. However,
the analysis of complex electronic commerce
protocols is still out of their reach. Meadows and
Syverson give a formal specification for payment
transactions in the SET protocol but don't describe the
actual analysis. Bolignano presented a new approach
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to the formal verification of electronic commerce
protocols and has been applied on the C-SET protocol
and SET protocol [5]. But no work described above
completely formalizes an entire phase of SET protocol.
Bella, Massacci and Paulson presented the formal
verification of cardholder registration in [12], which
models cardholder registration in Isabelle.
However, the methods for verification of electronic
commerce protocols is not indeed quite mature as
cryptographic protocols. Therefore, it is not surprising
that we cannot find a number of published works in
this area. The new types of threats, such as payment
card transaction etc., caused by new requirements of
on-line transaction will be a huge challenge to
analysis of electronic commerce protocols. Almost
without exception, existing tools cannot cover these
problems in many cases. In general, traditional tools
of c~ptogr~phic p~otocols ~ocus on the confidentiality
and mtegnty of information, and authenticate the
identity of one or more participants involved in the
message transfer. But some sensitive information such
as ac~ount number of credit card etc. requires higher
secunty.
The SET protocol is intended for the processing of
payment card transactions on electronic network.
However, the formal techniques used for the
verification of authentication protocols cannot be
directly applied to payment card transaction of SET
mainly because of the difference between traditional
authentication and particular properties of SET. SET
protocol also includes some standard authentication
requirement. Let us consider a typical instance in SET
p~otocol, in. which cardholder firstly must register
WIth a Certificate Authority (CA). The cardholder,
wh~n he receives initiate response, wants to verify
certI~cate and ensure that he was communicating with
the nght CA, and that CA has issued the initiate
response: which is not a replay of an old message etc.
Meanwhile, the payment properties also include some
special requirements. For example, when cardholder
verified the certificate of CA, he wants to be sure that
the proper certificate authority issues the certificate,
thus he must validate it by traversing the trust chain
that involves multilevel issuer. The validation process
may stop at a level that has been previously validated.
In case of fail of validation the cardholder could
cancel the transaction.
~ this paper, ENDL, described in our previous work,
ISused to analysis the phase of cardholder registration.
The .rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sectio? 2, the process of cardholder registration is
cursonly provided. Section 3 presents the notations,
metrology and terminology of ENDL. Section 4 gives
the complete verification to the cardholder registration.
Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Cardholder Registration in SET Protocol
The SET protocol [1] has been developed and
standardized by several credit card companies, such as
Visa and MasterCard and assisted by GTE, mM,
Microsoft, Netscape and RSA etc. SET uses
cryptography to provide confidentiality of information
and interoperability, to ensure payment integrity, and
to authenticate the identity of the cardholder and the
merchant to each other. In general, the payment
system participants include Cardholder (C), Issuer,
Merchant (M), Acquirer and Payment Gateway (P).
Cardholder uses the credit card, issued by issuer, to
purchase product or service provided by merchant.
Payment Gateway processes the payment instruction
from cardholder and the payment request from
merchant. SET introduces a hierarchy of trust, PKI
(Public key infrastructure) tree, about certificate
issuance. To verify the validity of a received
certificate, you must follow the trust tree to a known
trusted party, CARoot who provide the user with the
digital certificate for signature and encryption. The
public signature key and public key-exchange key of
CARoot are known to all SET participants and can be
used to verify the certificate. The verification, in fact,
may not always traverse the geopolitical certificate
authority like that.
~ET co~sist~ of five processes. The complete
mtr~ductIOn IS beyond this paper, thus we give an
outline to the first phase, cardholder registration, and
the other four phases will be described in our future
work. In the phase of cardholder registration, the user
can register the signature certificate, which will be
used to confirm that a transaction is from a legal
cardholder of a payment brand. Cardholder
registration includes seven fundamental steps.
Initiate request. Cardholder C sends initiate request to
CA.
Initiate response. After receiving the request, CA
generates response and digitally signs it by generating
th~ message. digest of the response and encrypting it
WIth CA pnvate signature key. Finally, CA sends
response along with the CA certificates, which can
provides the cardholder with the information
necessary to protect the primary account number (PAN)
in the registration form request, to cardholder.
Registration form request. The cardholder verifies the
CA certificate and signature and stores certificates for
later use during the registration process. Then, he
creates a registration form request and a random
sYrr.une~ckey. The random key is used to encrypt the
registranon form request. This key, along with the
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PAN is then encrypted with the CA public key-
exchange key. The encrypted registration form request
is transmitted to CA.
Registrationform. CA decrypts the encrypted message
and selects the appropriate registration form.
Cardholder certification request. The cardholder
verifies the CA certificate and signature. Then he fills
out the registration form with some information, such
as name, expiration date, and account billing address
etc., which is deemed to be necessary to identify the
certificate requester as the valid cardholder.
Meanwhile, he creates one pair of keys, private
signature key and public signature key, and certificate
request. The cardholder then combines the registration
information with the public key in a registration
message that is digitally signed with private signature
key. Next it creates two random symmetric keys. One
is used to encrypt the response, and the other is used
to encrypt the registration message. The second one,
along with the account information, such as account
number, expiration date and random number etc., is
then encrypted into the digital envelope using the CA
public key-exchange key. C then transmits encrypted
certificate request to CA.
Cardholder certificate. CA verifies C signature and
certificate request. Upon verification CA generates a
random number that is combined with the random
number generated by C to create a secret value, which
is used to protect the account information in the C
certificate. The secret value, along with the account
number etc., will be encoded using one-way hashing,
and the result is placed into the certificate. If the
account number and the secret value etc. are known,
the link to the certificate can be proven, but no one
can derive information by looking at the certificate.
Then, CA transmits response to C.
C verifies the certificate, and then stores it for use in
future electronic transaction.
3. Overview ofENDL
In this section, we will introduce some notations in
ENDL and explain how to use these notations to
describe the complicated operation, such as
encryption, decryption, and hashing etc., which are
largely used in SET protocol.
In general, uppercase X, Y, CA (Certificate Authorities)
and CARoot denote particular principals; m., m2, •.•.•. ,
and m; denote specific messages; T denotes specific
timestamp that can be used to both authenticate the
validity of message and assert that the message is
generated by current session; Cert denotes the
certificate need to be verified; CertReq denotes
registration form request of certificate; k denotes
encryption or decryption keys; Generate and Send
d.enote specific actions (Encryption and digital
SIgnature etc. are some mapping operation on message
but not action.). '
Function words are the abstract description of
operations on message. These operations consist of
the encryption, signature, message digest and
associated mapping relation of key etc.
E(m, k): This represents the operation that
message m is encrypted by the
symmetric (communication) key k.
SCm, k): This represents the operation that
message m is encrypted by the key
k, namely Kpb(X), Kpv(X), Spb(X),
and Spv(X) listed belmy.
H(m): This represents the message digest of
message : m encoded by one-way
hashing algorithm H(x). One-way
Hash function has the property that,
given the output, it is difficult to
determine the input.
Kpb(X): This represents the public key-
exchange key of X.
Kpv(X): This represents the private key-
exchange key of X.
Spb(X):- This represents the public signature
key ofX.
Spv(X): This represents the private signature
keyofX.
<m; , m2 , , mn>: This represents the
combination of messages
ml , m2 , , and mn•
When the message digest of a message is encrypted
using the senders' private key and is appended to the
original message, the result is known as digital
signature of the message (see abbreviation below).
The function word is the infrastructure necessary to
describe the complicated cryptographic operations.
Moreover, the related cryptographic algorithms used
to construct the encryption and decryption basically
are believed to be robust, but we also cannot
absolutely exclude the possibility that some intelligent
attacker can intercept the message and break down the
encryption successfully within before the expire date.
For the simplicity, we will demonstrate how to apply
ENDL to verify the cardholder registration in SET in
this paper.
Action: Applied to describe the communication
process in which principal is the executant of action
and try to execute some appointed task. There are
three types of actions listed below:
Generate(X, m): Applied to represent that X
generates the message m.
Send(X, Y, m): Applied to represent that X sends
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the message m to Y after X
successfully generated the
messagem.
Verify(X, Cert, <CAl. CAz, , CARoot»:
X verifies certificate Cert by traversing
the trust chain, CAb CAl, .•.•.• , to the
root CARoot (Below, we assume CA =
(CAl. CAz, , CARoot}).
Applying the conventional logic operator can derive
further action. Supposed a and P are basic sequences
of actions, then a 0 P denotes the conjunction of a
and P and can be treated as sequence of actions either.
According to the requirement of analysis of practical
secure transaction protocol, we can, in fact, add new
actions, but the three actions indicated above are
common in secure protocol.
Predicate: Applied to express the knowledge state and
belief relation of principals. There are four kinds of
predicates listed below:
Know(X, mY: This represents that X knows message m.
It is possible X generate the message m by itself or
receives m from Y. However, some malicious attacks
make X to forget message m even within its period of
validity. For this accidental situation, we will describe
these in later paper.
Auth(X, Y, m}: This represent that X authenticates
message m is sent by Y, and m has not been modified.
If X can authenticate the message m is valid, then
return value, true; otherwise return value, false.
IsVerified(X, CA, Cert): This represents that, if X can




P and Q present the set of formulae; a denotes the
sequence of actions. This assertion means if the
premise P is true then a can be executed, and the
conclusion Q will be true if a can be performed
successfully. Let PI and Pz denote formulae, then the
following are still regarded as formulae:
PI 0 r.. PI andPz.
PI 0 Pz: PI or Pz.
PI - Pz: PI implies Pz.
'0' , ' 0 " and '-' are some traditional logical
operators. We also imply some notation from set
theory. Suppose formula P consists of formula PI 0
Pz, we can say PlOP and Pz 0 P, which means PI
and Pz are the component of the set of P. Similarly,
SUppose formula P consists of formula PI 0 Pz, we
can say PlOP or P: 0 P, which means PI or Pzis the
component of the set of P.
Abbreviation:
The following abbreviations, in fact, imply complex
cryptographic operation, digital signature, message
digest and the like.
Sign(X, m) = <m, S«IDx, Him)», Spv(X))>: This
represents plain text m and X's identifier IDx are
affixed to X's digital signature.
Sign(X,mh = «m, S«IDx, T,H(m»,Spv(X))>:
Inserting the timestamp T into Sign(X, m):
Sr/.X, m) = S«IDx, Him)», Spv(X)): This represents
identifier IDx is attached to X's
digital signature before X encrypted the message
digest of m in private signature key Spv(X).
Sr/.X, mh = S«IDx, T, Him)», Spv(X)): Inserting
the timestamp T into Sr/.X, m)
CertK(X) = Sign(CA, <X, Kpb(X)> ): This
represents the key-exchange certificate of X;
CertS(X) = Sign( CA, <X, Spb(X»): This represents
the signature certificate of X.
Sign(X, m) and Sr/.X, m), in fact, prevail in some
secure transaction protocols, such as SET protocol,
and have been proved to be an efficient expression
that reduces the process of verification of secure
protocols in [2][3]. Using these basic terms and
statement described above, the protocol designer can
describe the fundamental operation of protocol at a
high abstraction level. These will significantly reduce
the complexity of analysis and authentication of SET
protocol. Next we will use them to give the entire
verification of cardholder registration in SET protocol.
4. The Verification of Cardholder Registration
In our former work, we have shown how to use ENDL
to validate several instances in SET protocol.
Currently, some related works [5][12] are being
developed to analysis this protocol, but the large
electronic commerce protocols, such as SET, are very
complex and have never been formalized before.
Meanwhile, the specification of SET protocol itself is
incomplete [12]. For instance, Cardholder verify that
the Chall-EE, a fresh random, received is equal to the
one sent in the CardCInitReq. Actually, it is
dangerous since intruder could intercept Chall-EE and
replay it. Thus, it is not surprising that some
potentially dangerous flaws can be detected during the
verification of cardholder registration. We also
suggest the feasible method to settle the problem and
want to draw the attention of protocol designer since
the specification of protocol is imperfect.
Based on the description of cardholder registration in
Section 2, the verification is also divided into seven
phases correspondingly. For simplicity, some hidden
message and complex operation such as secret value
and hashing algorithm etc. are abstracted away.
4.1 Initiate Request
In order to send message to merchant M, C must
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register with a certificate authority. The registration is
started when C sends initiate request InitReq to CA
and want to get a copy of CA's key-exchange
certificate. By abbreviation, Send(C, CA, InitReq), we
denote this process. Nothing needs to be certified
since no message is deemed necessary to be protected
during this stage.
4.2 Initiate Response
When CA receives InitReq, it sends initiate response
InitRes along with its certificates, which provides C
with the information necessary to protect the PAN
during the registration form request.
a = Generate(CA, InitRes) 0 Send(CA, C,
<Initkes, S(H(InitRes), Spv(CA))» 0 Send(CA, C,
<CertS(CA), CertK(CA»)
The verification will not be repeated since we have
given the analysis of this phase in [3] and found some
subtle flaws need to be concerned about. Actually, the
intruder can intercept the communication between the
C and CA and replay this message.
(1) C --+ Z (CA): InitReq
(2) Z(C) --+ CA: InitReq'
(3)CA--+Z(C): <CertS(CA), CertK(CA),
InitRes', S(H(InitRes'), Spv(CA))>
(2') Z(C) --+ CA: InitReq"
(3')CA--+Z(C): <CertS(CA), CertK(CA),
InitRes ", S(H( InitRes"), Spv( CA))>
(4)Z(CA)--+C: <CertS(CA), CertK(CA),
Initkes', S(H( InitRes'), Spv( CA))>
Here, the intruder Z intercepts the initial request from
C to CA and replaces with a new initial request
initReq' and sends the result to CA as message (2). CA
replies with message (3). Z impersonates C to
produces a new message (2') and send to CA. CA
answer C with corresponding message (3'), and then Z
intercepts it. At last, Z impersonates CA to send an
outdated message (4) that is intercepted by Z from
message (3). This attack is continuously used until C
wants to bring about authentication between C and CA
again. This problem can be fixed by adapting the
protocol, for instance by modify message (3) to
include the timestamp T and identifier IDcA before the
encryption, otherwise C cannot authenticate the
message since it doesn't include timestamp and
cardholder's identifier.
(3) CA--+Z(C): <CertS(CA), CertK(CA), InitRes',
S«IDCA, T, H(InitRes'», Spv(CA))>
This will prevent the above attack from working,
because the intruder will be unable to replay the
message as before [14].
On the other hand, CA may alter the initiate response
InitRes for the sake of network block etc. If CA
do~sn't let C know what has been altered about
ImtR~s. ?r let C know the change but the content of
new mitiate response doesn't keep the same as the old
one, C should stop the current transaction and validate
the initiate response again conforming to R-lli-3 or R-
III-8 in Appendix. We don't need to concern about the
CA certificates since trusted authority issues them.
4.3 Registration Form Request
Now that cardholder C has a copy of the CA key-
exchange certificate CertK(CA), so he can request a
registration request RegFormReq.
a = Generatet C, PAN) 0 Generate(C, RegFormReq) 0
Generatet C, kj) 0 Send(C, CA, E(RegFormReq, kj)) 0
Send(C, CA, sc-»; PAN>, Kpb(CA)))
CA uses private key-exchange key Kpv(CA) to decrypt
the symmetric key k, and primary account number
PAN. Using the symmetric key kj, he can decrypts the
RegFormReq.
When C uses Kpb(CA) to encrypt <k i. PAN>, he
doesn't affix timestamp T and identifier IDc to this
message. Thus, the intruder Z can repeat the similar
attack like the case in initiate response since Kpb(CA)
is known to all participants.
Msg 4.3.1 C --+ Z (CA): S(«k., PAN>, Kpb(CA))
Msg 4.3.2 C --+ Z (CA): E(RegFomzReq, kj)
Msg 4.3.3 Z(C)--+CA: S«k/, PAN'>, Kpb(CA))
Msg 4.3.4 Z(C) --+ CA: E(RegFormReq', k, ')
Actually, the cardholder C can alert the registration
form request RegFormReq or symmetric key k] since
he can wonder these messages have been
masqueraded or the communication of network is
blocked. Meanwhile, whether the principals possess
memory to message is also a crucial security factor,
but the detailed description is outside this paper. Thus,
we only show which rule the result derives from, but
not give the details. Several possibilities are listed
below:
(1) C alters RegFormReq but not alter k],
(2) C alters k: but not alter RegFormReq,
(3) C alters RegFormReq and kj,
In (1), C generates a different RegFormReq. If C
doesn't let CA know what has been changed or let CA
know the change but the content of new registration
form request doesn't keep the same as the old one, CA
should fail to authenticate RegFormReq conforming
to R-III-3 or R-III-8; In (2), C creates a new kj• If C
doesn't let CA know what has been changed about kj,
CA should fail to authenticate <k-, PAN> conforming
to R-lli-2 or R-lli-7; In (3), C alters RegFormReq and
kj. If C doesn't let CA know what have been changed
about k, and RegFormReq or let CA know the new
RegFormReq but it doesn't keep the same as the old
one, LA should fail to authenticate <kr, PAN> and
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RegFormReq conforming to R-III-l, 2, 4, 5, 6. Once
one of them happens, CA must cancel this transaction
and stop to send the registration form to C. But SET
doesn't provide similar security policy in its
specification.
4.4 Registration Form
In this stage, CA identifies the cardholder's financial
institution using the PAN and selects the appropriate
registration form RegForm for C.
a = Generate(CA, RegForm) 0 Send(CA, C,
<RegForm, S(H(RegForm), Spv(CA))> )0
Send(CA, C, CertS(CA))
When C receives the registration form, he need to
verify the CertS(CA) by using a special trust chain,
PIG tree.
(1) Send(CA, C, CertS(CA)) [action]
(2) Know(C, CertS(CA)) (1)[R-l]
(3) Verify(C, CertS(CA), CAY [action]
(4) IsVerified(C, CA, CertS(CA)) [discriminant]
(5)Auth(C, CA, <Spb(CA), Spv(CA») (2)(3)(4)
[7-1]
The verification process may stop at a level that has
been previously validated. But if C cannot verify the
CA certificate is valid during traversing the trust chain,
{CA], CA2, •••••• , CARoot}, he will stop the transaction.
After confirming the validity of CertS(CA), C can
start to verify CA signature. Because CA doesn't
include the timestamp T and identifier IDcA in the
encrypted message, so the intruder Z can repeat the
same attack as before.




We are concerned with the direct exposure of
symmetric key kj due to negligence or a design flaw in
the system, i.e., an intruder can break into the
computer and get the key.
(1') Z(C) ~ CA: <E(RegFormReq', kj)) ,
S«k],PAN>, Kpb(CA))»
(2') CA~Z(Cj: <CertS(CA), RegForm',
S(H(RegForm'), Spv(CA))>
(3) Z(CA)~C: <CertS(CAj, RegForm',
S(H(RegForm), Spv(CA))>
Obviously, the cardholder C cannot verify the
registration form since the RegForm' is different from
the RegForm, which is used to create the message
digest.
In practical transaction, CA may alter RegForm for
wrong format or content etc. If CA doesn't let C know
what has been changed about RegForm or let C know
the change but the content of new registration form
doesn't keep the same as the old one, C should fail to
authenticate RegForm conforming to R-III-3 or R-III-
8 and stop the current transaction, otherwise this will
cause some potentially dangerous security Regretfully,
no similar requirement is appeared in SET protocol.
4.5 Cardholder Certificate Request
Firstly, C needs to create one pair of keys, Spv(C) and
Spb(C), and then C will complete the registration form
and generate certificate request CertReq = (IDc,
Texpiration date). IDc includes the cardholder's name and
billing address etc. Next C creates two symmetric key,
k2 and k3. k3 is then encrypted along with PAN,
expiration date Texpiration date. Let m = <CertReq, k2,
Spbt C)», Rnd denotes random number generated by C
and will be used by CA to generate the certificate.
a= Generate(C, <Spvi C), Spbt C)»} 0
Generate(C, CertReq) 0 Generate/C. k2) 0
Generate( C, k3) 0 Send( C, CA, E( <m, S(m,
Spv(C))>, k3) 0 Send(C, CA, S«k3, Rnd,
Texpirationdate, PAN>, Kpb(CA)))
CA decrypts the digital envelop to obtain symmetric
key k3, the account information and random number
Rnd. This symmetric key then is used to decrypt the
certificate request CertReq. Later, CA verifies
cardholder signature and certificate request. If the
validation fails, the request is rejected and an
appropriate response is returned to cardholder.
Because C affixes IDc and Texpiration date to certificate
request, so the signature can be verified. Based on the
random number Rnd, PAN and T expiration date, CA can
verify certificate request. But, C may modify (Spb(C),
k2, k3} or CertReq, it is divided into three possibilities
listed below:
(1) C alters CertReq but not alter (Spb(C), k2, k3},
(2) (2) C alters (Spb(C), k2, k3} but not alter
CertReq,
(3) C alters (Spb(C), k2, k3} and CertReq,
In (1), C generates a different CertReq. If C doesn't
let CA know what has been changed or let CA know
the change but the content of new certificate request
doesn't keep the same as the old one, CA should fail
to authenticate CertReq conforming to R-III-3 or R-
III-8; In (2), C modifies (Spb(C), k2, k3}. If C doesn't
let CA know what has been changed about them, CA
should fail to authenticate the certificate request
conforming to R-III-2 or R-III-7; In (3), C alters
CertReq and (Spb(C), k2, k«}. If C doesn't let CA
know what have been changed about (Spb(C), k2, k3}
and CertReq or let CA know the new CertReq but it
doesn't keep the same as the old one, CA should fail
to authenticate the certificate request CertReq
conforming to R-III-l, 2, 4, 5, 6. Once one of them
happens, CA must cancel this transaction and stop to
send the certificate to C. This can be acted as a
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complementary to future version of SET.
4.6 Cardholder Certificate
Upon verification of certificate request, CA will issue
a certificate and transmit it to C. The symmetric key
k, comes form cardholder request and is created by C.
• 0: = Generatei Cs, CertS(C)) 0 Generate/Cn,
CertRes) 0 Sendt Cs, C, Certst Cn 0
Send(CA, C, E«CertRes, StHt Certlces ),
Spv(CA))>, k2)
When C receives the response from the CA, it begins
to verify certificate CertS(C),
(1) Send(CA, C, co-sec» [action]
(2) Know(C, CertS(C)) (l)[R-l]
(3) Verify(C, ce-scc: CA) [action]
(4) IsverifiediC, CA, CertS(C)) [discriminant]
(5) Auth(C, CA, <SpblC), Spvt C») (2)(3)( 4)
[7-1 ]
(4) denotes a discriminant. If it returns true then
CerrSi C) is verified, otherwise Cert St C) cannot be
authenticated, namely DAuth( C, CA, <Spbt C),
SpvtC)»}.
Using the symmetric key k2, C decrypts response,
Because CA doesn't include the timestamp and
identifier in response message, thus the intruder can
repeat the same attack as above. By adapting the
protocol, this problem can be fixed.
Msg CA-+C: £( <CertRes,S(T,IDn,H(CertRes),
Spv(CA))>, k2)
Meanwhile, if CA modifies CertS(C) or CertRes and
doesn't let C know what have been changed or let C
know the alteration but they doesn't keep the same as
the old one, C should not verify the return certificates
and cancel this transaction conforming to
accumulation rule R-ID-3 or R-ID-8, This is also a
subtle flaw in SET that deserves to be concerned
about.
Based on above analysis of cardholder registration in
SET, we believe some potentially dangerous flaws of
SET have been unveiled by our approach. This will
contribute to the future revision of SET protocol.
5. Conclusion
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, most of
former works focus on the formalization of
cryptographic protocols, Therefore we present how to
use ENDL developed in our previous work to verify
the Cardholder Registration in SET protocol.
Although Bolignano presented a new approach to the
formal verification of electronic commerce protocols
and has been applied on the C-SET protocol and SET
protocol, it didn't give the analysis of an entire stage
in SET protocol. Bella, Massacci and Paulson
described the formal verification of cardholder
registration, which models cardholder registration in
Isabelle.
Because electronic commerce protocols are very
complicated to be formalized. thus none of current
works can assure that the protocols are absolutely
secure by verification in their methods. Thus, more
and more approaches will be introduced to this area.
Indeed, we believe that there will be many flaws in
electronic commerce protocols that come to light as
research progresses. For this reason, we developed a
new approach before and used it to validate the
cardholder registration phase in SET in this paper. The
result proves it is successful to unveil some
potentially dangerous flaws of SET protocol.
Meanwhile, we suggest some feasible measures to fix
these problems.
In this paper, we only give the verification of
cardholder registration in SET. The analysis to other
four phases is currently being operated. Really, if the
principals in SET protocol, including the ce:tificate
authority CA, are reliable and keep their own
information not to be divulged to others, the protocol
is robust enough to resist hostile attacks. However,
different principals may collude and disclose part of
message respectively. By putting these messages
together, the intruder can breach the secret. Our future
work will concentrate on the scenario of collusion,
except for finishing the validation of the remaining
four stages of SET.
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Appendix:
(R-l) Revelation: Know(X, m) ~ Send(X, Y,mf(now(z' m)
7-1 PKI: Know(X, CertS(Y)) 0 Verify(x, CertS(Y),
CA)A 0 oIsVerified(X, CertS(Y))





PI-aO Generate (X, «newkey, m'» 0Q
(R-lli-2) Accumulation 2:
PI-aQ.Generate(x' newkeyl, DKnow(Y, newkeyl
PI-aO Generate (X, newkey) 0 (1 0Q
(R-lli-3) Accumulation 3:
PI-a V, Generate(X, ml, oKnow(Y,<m', m> I




PI-ao Generate (X,< newkey,m»DQ
(R-lli-5) Accumulation 5:
PI-aQ,Generate(x' <newkey,m», DKnow(Y, newkey)
Pi-ao Generate (X, <newkey,m» 0(1 DQ
(R-lli-6) Accumulation 6:
PI-a Q, Generate(X, <newkey, m», DKnow(Y, <m',
m»
PI-aO Generate (X, «newkey, m» 0 (1 0Q
(R-lli-7) Accumulation 7:
PI-a Q, Generate(x' newkey), 0 KnowO'; newkey)
PI-aOGenerate (X, newkey) DQ
(R-lli-8) Accumulation 8:
PI-a Q, Generate(X, m), DEquaUm', m)
PI-a 0 Generate (X, m) DQ
